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Abstract
Double-blinded trials are often considered the gold standard for research, but significant bias may result from
unblinding of participants and investigators. Although the CONSORT guidelines discuss the importance of
reporting bevidence that blinding was successfulQ, it is unclear what constitutes appropriate evidence. Among
studies reporting methods to evaluate blinding effectiveness, many have compared groups with respect to the
proportions correctly identifying their intervention at the end of the trial. Instead, we reasoned that participants’
beliefs, and not their correctness, are more directly associated with potential bias, especially in relation to selfreported health outcomes.
During the Water Evaluation Trial performed in northern California in 1999, we investigated blinding
effectiveness by sequential interrogation of participants about their bblindedQ intervention assignment (active or
placebo). Irrespective of group, participants showed a strong tendency to believe they had been assigned to the
active intervention; this translated into a statistically significant intergroup difference in the correctness of
participants’ beliefs, even at the start of the trial before unblinding had a chance to occur. In addition, many
participants (31%) changed their belief during the trial, suggesting that assessment of belief at a single time
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does not capture unblinding. Sequential measures based on either two or all eight questionnaires identified
significant group-related differences in belief patterns that were not identified by the single, cross-sectional
measure.
In view of the relative insensitivity of cross-sectional measures, the minimal additional information in more than
two assessments of beliefs and the risk of modifying participants’ beliefs by repeated questioning, we conclude
that the optimal means of assessing unblinding is an intergroup comparison of the change in beliefs (and not their
correctness) between the start and end of a randomized controlled trial.
D 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Masking; Randomized controlled trial; Double-blind method; Research design; Placebo effect

1. Introduction and background
The randomized, placebo-controlled trial is often described as the gold standard for research involving
human participants. An important aim of the study design is to allow comparisons between groups of
participants whose characteristics are, on average, as similar as possible with the exception of the
intervention being studied. This is achieved primarily through randomization, which aims to prevent
selection bias and balance the distribution of measured and unmeasured confounding variables between
the active and control groups. Even if randomization fails to distribute measured confounders evenly
between groups, their effects can be adjusted for in the analysis. The benefits of randomization are
further increased by blinding, a method to hide the true nature of the intervention assigned to each
participant from participants and investigators and hence prevent the exposure–outcome relation under
study from being influenced by knowledge or belief about the intervention.
It has been estimated that trials that do not attempt to use double-blinding exaggerate treatment
effects by 14% compared with trials that do attempt to double-blind [16]. Because the latter group
includes well-blinded and poorly blinded trials, it is likely that a comparison of treatment effects in
successfully blinded versus unblinded trials would show an even larger bias than 14%. In recognition
of the importance of effective blinding in such trials, the Consolidated Standards of Reporting Trials
(CONSORT) statement describes many aspects of blinding methodology that may be included in
published reports of randomized controlled trials; these include evidence for successful blinding
among participants, those administering the intervention, outcome assessors and data analysts [1,2].
However, it is unclear what constitutes adequate evidence of blinding effectiveness. A recent study
found that only 8% (15/191) of published randomized placebo-controlled trials reported any
assessment of blinding [3].
Participants or researchers may become aware of the intervention assignment before allocation
(failure of allocation concealment), or after allocation (unblinding), and the nature and magnitude of the
resulting biases are potentially different [4]. Allocation concealment has been described as a means of
preventing selection bias caused by differences in enrollment or early withdrawals of participants from
the study, whereas blinding aims primarily to prevent ascertainment bias and attrition [4].
Participants’ beliefs about the intervention to which they have been assigned may affect their
experience or reporting of symptoms through a variety of mechanisms that probably differ from study to
study and may be related to the placebo effect. This has been described as a mixture of factors including
classical conditioning effects, spontaneous improvement in clinical course and the tendency for
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participants to give polite or bexpectedQ answers [5–7]. The magnitude of the placebo effect may be
related to the participant’s perceived likelihood of receiving an effective medication [8]. Beliefs about
which intervention has been assigned can affect outcome reporting by participants and outcome
assessment by researchers, and also lead to differences in adherence to the study protocol. Adherence
can itself predict outcome within either the active or placebo arms [9]. Interactions between unblinding
and patient preferences for a particular treatment may also influence outcome [10].
Blinding is not always possible to achieve and can be compromised in various ways. A key concern is
the interplay between noticeable physical characteristics of the intervention (e.g., the smell, taste or
texture of a pill) and participants’ expectations, whether the latter are based on knowledge or assumption
[11,12]. Side effects and/or the beneficial effects of a drug may lead to unblinding when they reach a
discernible threshold [11]. It has been argued that bthe more potent the therapeutic variable, the less
likely its efficiency can be proven in a double blind studyQ [12]. This effect, termed Philip’s paradox,
describes the introduction of bias as a direct result of unblinding caused by the efficacy of the
intervention; its implication is that unblinding is less likely if the study end-point is measurable but
cannot be detected by the patient (e.g. a laboratory test) [11]. Unblinding may also result from
participants’ attempts to identify their intervention [13–15] or flawed protocol design or execution,
which provide cues to participants [11].
Few studies have focused on strategies to evaluate blinding in detail. Most were based primarily on
the proportions of participants guessing their group assignment correctly at the end of the study,
analyzed either within treatment groups or overall [1,13,14,17–23]. Although blinded participants might
be expected to have a 50% chance of guessing that they had received the active or placebo intervention,
it has been argued that this can be expected only under exceptional circumstances [11]. Some
investigators have supplemented primary guesses with bforcedQ guesses from participants who initially
responded that they did not know (DK), or with measures of certainty [13,14,22,24]. Hughes and Krahn
described a series of procedures to assess blinding, beginning with a v 2 test comparing the proportions of
correct and incorrect answers in each group, and including analyses stratified by the correctness of
participants’ guesses [16]. Howard et al. [14], James et al. [19] and Bang et al. [23] have described
summary indices of blinding based on the proportions guessing correctly, incorrectly and DK (Appendix
A). Many investigators have relied on a single evaluation of the correctness of beliefs at the end of the
trial. Longitudinal approaches, based on sequential interrogation about beliefs during the trial, have been
largely overlooked, although the importance of studying the temporal characteristics of unblinding has
been raised previously [11].
In this study, we argue that cross-sectional analyses cannot capture unblinding and that, rather, one
must account for participants’ initial beliefs as well. We then test the hypothesis that unblinding can be
captured adequately by a measure based on group-specific initial and final beliefs about group
assignment (i.e., at weeks 2 and 16) against the null hypothesis that more interrogations are needed (i.e.,
at least six of eight possible biweekly responses).

2. Methods
We previously investigated participant blinding in a community-based pilot study in northern
California to investigate the effect on gastrointestinal infectious illness of water treatment units
installed at the kitchen sink [25,26]. To promote successful blinding, the active and placebo units were
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designed to be externally identical and to produce water with similar characteristics such as
temperature, taste and odor. The active unit consisted of a filter and ultraviolet light system in series;
in the placebo unit, the filter casing was empty and a glass sleeve around the light prevented emission
of ultraviolet wavelength [25]. The water treatment units, the primary evaluation of blinding, James’
index [19], and the primary health outcome, bhighly credible gastrointestinal illnessQ (HCGI) [27],
were described in detail previously [25]. The sample size for the original study was based on our
ability to identify a blinding index (BI) exceeding 0.5 with a type I error rate of 0.05 and type II error
rate of 0.10 [25]. On eight occasions, we asked all participants aged z12 years to guess their group
assignment in a self-administered questionnaire that they returned by mail. Based on Byington’s
approach [13], we asked them to choose one of five responses: bdefinitely the active water treatment
deviceQ, bprobably the active water treatment deviceQ, bprobably not the active water treatment
deviceQ, bdefinitely not the active water treatment deviceQ or bI’m not sureQ. We asked participants
who responded bI’m not sureQ to make a guess, and this bforced guessQ could be either bprobably the
active water treatment deviceQ or bprobably not the active water treatment deviceQ. For the analyses
presented here, we combined bdefinitelyQ and bprobablyQ responses to a single category. Participants
were first questioned 2 weeks after the study began and every 2 weeks until 16 weeks were
completed. They were also asked to write the reasons for their beliefs and answer questions about
their health.
We examined several cross-sectional approaches to evaluate blinding effectiveness. Methods based on
the correctness of answers included James’ index [19], Howard’s index [14] and a v 2 test of the
correctness of respondents’ beliefs by intervention group. Methods based on beliefs about group
assignment included a v 2 test of respondents’ beliefs (i.e., active, placebo, DK) by intervention group,
and an analysis of the association between exposure and outcome stratified by belief, which was reported
previously [25].
We devised two longitudinal measures to describe patterns of belief throughout the trial. For both
measures, we replaced DK responses with the corresponding forced guesses. A response was defined
as valid if the participant chose one of the initial five options described above, even if they refused to
provide a forced guess. (1) Our two-point measure consisted of beliefs at weeks 2 and 16 (i.e., active–
active, placebo–placebo, active–placebo, placebo–active); we compared these between groups using
Fisher’s exact test. (2) Our six-point measure used all valid responses given during the study for
participants responding on at least six occasions, including weeks 2 and 16. We defined participants’
beliefs as consistent (active or placebo) if all responses were identical, allowing up to one opposite
belief during weeks 4 through 14 (e.g. if 0 is bbelieve activeQ, 1 is bbelieve placeboQ then 11111111
and 11011111 are consistent, but 10000000 is not). Participants were defined as switching belief (to
placebo or to active) if they changed their belief exactly once during the study (e.g. 11000000,
00001111). This category aimed to identify participants with a clear time at which bunblindingQ
occurred. The remaining participants were classified as undecided (e.g. 01111110, 10111101). We
compared these five categories between groups using Fisher’s exact test. Note that the two-point and
six-point measures are not independent: e.g. participants whose six-point measure is classified as
consistently active must, by definition, have responded active–active at weeks 2 and 16, although
some participants responding active–active at weeks 2 and 16 may have varied responses in the
intervening period. The sensitivity of these results to the number of queries about beliefs was
investigated by comparing the two sequential measures within the subset of participants who gave
valid responses at weeks 2 and 16.
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We compared measures of belief using likelihood ratio tests to identify differences between nested
models. In addition, we investigated whether DK was synonymous with bblindingQ and determined the
reasons for participants’ beliefs.

3. Results
Water treatment units were installed in 80 households, 3 of which were subsequently excluded from
the study [25]; the remaining 77 households comprised 236 individuals. Participants aged z12 years
(N=179) were asked to report their beliefs on 8 occasions and did so on average 6.6 times (median 8,
interquartile range 6–8). Valid responses were provided at week 2 by 172 (96%) respondents, at week 16
by 145 (81%) and on all 8 occasions by 123 (69%); 132 (74%) reported their beliefs on at least 6
occasions including weeks 2 and 16.
3.1. Analyses of correctness of beliefs
At week 16, correctness of belief was strongly associated with intervention group; for example,
after redistributing DK responses using forced guesses, 72% of active group participants and 40% of
placebo participants guessed their assignments correctly (mean difference, 33%; 95% confidence
interval [CI]=17–49%). Howard’s bproportion who really knewQ at week 16 was 0.09 (CI=0.04–0.18).
James’ BI was 0.64 (CI=0.57–0.72). Successful blinding is presumed for Howard’s index if the
confidence interval includes 0 and for James’ index if it excludes 0.5 [14,19].
3.2. Analyses of beliefs
3.2.1. Beliefs at weeks 2 and 16 (cross-sectional analyses)
A majority of participants in both groups believed or guessed they were in the active group at the start
of the trial (week 2, 76%; Fig. 1a) and also at the end of the trial (week 16, 67%; Fig. 1b). The
distribution of beliefs did not differ significantly between groups at either time point (Fisher’s exact tests,
P=0.605 and P=0.139, respectively).
3.2.1.1. Certainty of beliefs and the bdon’t knowQ response. On the basis of beliefs ranked by
categories of certainty, there was no statistically significant difference in certainty of beliefs between
groups at week 16 (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, P=0.154). Participants who were unsure of their group
assignment constituted 50% of respondents at week 2 and 33% at week 16. At week 2, we saw an
increased tendency for forced guesses to be bactiveQ among those who initially said they didn’t know
(72%, 57/79) as well as among those who initially expressed a belief (78%, 67/86) ( P=0.393). In
contrast, at week 16, the probability of forced guesses being bactiveQ among those who initially said
that they didn’t know (49%, 21/43) was lower than it was among those who initially expressed a
belief (75%, 73/97) (P=0.002).
3.2.1.2. Reasons for participants’ beliefs. Of 179 participants, 171 (96%) stated z1 reason during
the study for their beliefs about the intervention. Intervention-related factors (including taste,
temperature, odor and appearance of the water, and physical characteristics of the filter) accounted
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Fig. 1. The classification of belief patterns by cross-sectional and sequential measures of belief among 132 participants who
reported beliefs at least 6 times including weeks 2 and 16 (N=132). (a) beliefs at week 2; (b) beliefs at week 16; (c) change in
beliefs between two time points, weeks 2 and 16 (b2-point measureQ); (d) change in beliefs over at least 6 of 8 time points, weeks
2 through 16 (b6-point measureQ). (n) Placebo group; (5) active group; (a) consistent active=active at week 2; switch active to
placebo, switch placebo to active, undecided=not applicable; (b) consistent active=active at week 16; switch active to placebo,
switch placebo to active, undecided=not applicable; (c) consistent active=active at weeks 2 and 16; undecided=not applicable;
(d) consistent active=active at weeks 2 and 16 and at all or all but one time points in between; switch active to placebo=active at
week 2, placebo at week 16 and only one change of belief in between; undecided=none of the above.

for 77% (647/836) of reasons. Outcome-related factors (i.e., participants’ health) accounted for only
6% (52/836) of reasons given for participants’ beliefs about the intervention. After the study,
participants in 6% (5/77) of families admitted trying to unblind themselves, either by trying to open
the filter, testing the water or by other means.
3.2.2. Change in beliefs between weeks 2 and 16 (two-point analyses)
During the trial, 110/132 (83%) maintained their initial belief and 22/132 (17%) switched their belief.
The trends in participants’ beliefs during the study differed significantly by intervention group (Fisher’s
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exact test, P=0.013) (Fig. 1c). For example, a disproportionately high number of participants in the
placebo group switched their belief from active to placebo (22%); 4% of participants in the active group
switched their belief from active to placebo.
To examine further the relationship between beliefs and gastrointestinal illness, we stratified the
intervention effect by change in beliefs (Table 2). Unexpectedly, the rate of illness was relatively low and
the intervention effect was qualitatively different among those who consistently believed they were in
the placebo group.
3.2.3. Sequential interrogation throughout the study (six-point analysis)
A large majority of participants (69%, 91/132) reported the same beliefs at all time points throughout
the study. The proportion fulfilling our definition of consistent beliefs in the six-point analysis (75%, 99/
132) was lower than the corresponding proportion (active–active or placebo–placebo) in the two-point
analysis (83%, 110/132). Similarly the bswitchingQ proportion according to the six-point analysis (11%,
15/132) is lower than that of the two-point analysis (17%, 22/132). The six-point measure, which was
the only one capable of identifying participants with multiple changes of belief, classified 14% as
bundecidedQ. The more detailed categories defined by the six-point measure again provided evidence
that belief patterns were distributed differentially between intervention groups ( P=0.039, Fig. 1d).
Repeating the analyses with six different definitions of consistency, we continued to find evidence of
differences between intervention groups, although a seventh measure, in which bconsistentQ was defined
as 100% identical beliefs, was less convincing (v 2 (df=4), P=0.098) (data not shown).
Using likelihood ratio tests, we compared the group-related differences in beliefs using nested
models. The difference between the two-point and six-point models was not significant ( P=0.521),
suggesting that the six-point model did not provide significant additional information over the twopoint model. We estimate that, in our sample of 132, an intergroup difference in the proportions of
participants who were undecided could have been identified in terms of a minimum risk ratio of 3.1
with a type I error rate of 0.05 and power of 0.8.

4. Discussion
In most evaluations of blinding, participants are only asked to try to identify their intervention
group at the end of the trial. For a simple comparison of beliefs at the end of the trial to identify
significant intergroup differences caused by unblinding depends on the assumption that participants
are undecided at baseline with respect to beliefs. By actually measuring beliefs at baseline in the
sequential analysis, we increased our sensitivity to identify changes in belief indicative of unblinding.
Furthermore, by showing that use of the two-point measure gave results similar to the six-point
measure, we provided evidence that repeated questioning of participants during this trial was
unnecessary. This is important because of concerns that repeated questioning draws attention to the
issue and may cause additional unblinding and bias.
It has been argued that ba double blind design can work only if the subject is clearly free from the
influence of suggestion resulting from accurate information about his medicationQ [20]. This statement
illustrates a common misconception in the evaluation of blinding; bias does not result simply because
some participants can identify their intervention group correctly. Bias occurs when intergroup
differences in belief about group assignment differentially affect the outcome and bias the relative risk
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(RR) estimate (Appendix B). The relationship between beliefs and their correctness is such that when
the two groups are similar with respect to the correctness of beliefs, the beliefs themselves must differ
(Table 1). Our results illustrate that, if correctness of beliefs examined at baseline showed a strong
association with group, this could not be attributed to unblinding since participants have no experience
of the clinical trial at baseline. Furthermore, since many participants maintain their initial belief, we
argue that beliefs, and not their correctness, should be used to evaluate blinding effectiveness.
Is a comparison of belief patterns by group a reliable method to identify bias caused by unblinding?
If the beliefs themselves are similar in both groups and these beliefs influence health outcomes to the
same extent in each group (i.e. there is no effect modification), one might expect the RR estimate to
be unbiased; however, we note that bias can result even under these circumstances. It can be shown
that, whereas (i) beliefs about the intervention that lead to non-differential under-reporting of the
outcome in both intervention groups will not bias RR, (ii) beliefs that lead to non-differential overreporting of the outcome will bias RR towards the null (Appendix B). These situations are equivalent
to non-differential misclassification of the outcome with (i) perfect specificity and imperfect sensitivity
and (ii) perfect sensitivity and imperfect specificity, respectively; these effects have been studied in detail
[28,29]. Thus, bias in the RR may occur even if beliefs are comparable in the intervention groups; in the
absence of effect modification, RR will be unbiased or biased towards the null. In the presence of effect
modification, bias in either direction may result.
To investigate further the effects of beliefs in our study, we stratified the intervention effect by the
beliefs observed at weeks 2 and 16 (active–active, placebo–placebo, active–placebo and placebo–
Table 1
Cross-sectional analysis of beliefs and correctness of beliefs about group assignment at week 16
Intervention group
Active (N)

Placebo (N)

Mean difference

Total

(95% confidence interval)

% (N)

Belief
Active
57% (43)
43% (30)
13% (ÿ3% to 30%)
Placebo
16% (12)
17% (12)
ÿ2% (ÿ14% to 11%)
Don’t know
28% (21)
39% (27)
ÿ12% (ÿ27% to 4%)
Forced guess active
14% (11)
14% (10)
Forced guess placebo
11% (8)
20% (14)
Refused
3% (2)
4% (3)
Total
100% (76)
100% (69)
Don’t combine forced with initial guesses (active, placebo, DK): v 2 (df = 2) = 2.86, P = 0.239
Do combine forced with initial guesses (active, placebo, refused): Fisher’s exact test (df = 2), P = 0.238
Correctness of belief
Correct guess
57% (43)
17% (12)
Incorrect guess
16% (12)
43% (30)
Don’t know
28% (21)
39% (27)
Forced guess correct
14% (11)
20% (14)
Forced guess incorrect
11% (8)
14% (10)
Refused
3% (2)
4% (3)
Total
100% (76)
100% (69)
Don’t combine forced with initial guesses:v 2 (df = 2) = 25.7, Pb 0.001
Do combine forced with initial guesses: v 2 (df = 2) =16.4, Pb 0.001

39% (24% to 54%)
ÿ28% (ÿ42% to ÿ13%)
ÿ12% (ÿ27% to 4%)

50%
17%
33%
14%
15%
3%
100%

(73)
(24)
(48)
(21)
(22)
(5)
(145)

38%
29%
33%
17%
12%
3%
100%

(55)
(42)
(48)
(25)
(18)
(5)
(145)
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active; Table 2). Unexpectedly, the rate of illness was substantially lower among those who
consistently believed they were in the placebo group, suggesting that beliefs may have affected the
outcome or vice versa. Stratification also provided some qualitative evidence that beliefs systematically modified the effect of the intervention. This could be formally tested via the three-way
interaction between group, outcome and belief strata, given a larger sample size. Nonetheless, in
addition to reporting the intervention effect overall, it can be reported separately for those who
consistently believed they were in the placebo group and those not holding this belief. In a stratified
analysis, the stratum-specific RR should equal the overall RR if there is no confounding; otherwise it
may be necessary to report belief-specific treatment effects [30]. Two other important situations can
cause relative risks to differ by stratum; (i) effect modification (i.e. the effect of the intervention on
outcome is modified according to a participant’s belief) or (ii) if belief about group assignment is
involved in a causal pathway including both exposure and outcome. For example, the physical
characteristics of the intervention led participants to believe they are in the active or placebo group,
and the belief decreases or increases the likelihood or severity of illness [31]. A primary motivation
for blinding is to prevent this causal pathway. If, due to blinding failure, belief behaves as a timedependent intermediate variable, then stratification and simple multivariate models should not be used
to adjust statistically for the effects of belief, although stratified analyses may be helpful qualitatively
in describing the relation between belief and outcome. In the future, it may be possible to adapt other
statistical methods [32,33] to adjust for the effects of beliefs, by comparing beliefs and outcomes
sequentially during the study.
It has been reported previously that bdon’t knowQ may not always represent successful blinding
[13,14,21,24] although it is desirable because it suggests a weakly held view. Using bforced guessesQ,
we showed that participants who responded DK at the start of the study held beliefs in similar
proportions to those who provided responses without prompting (i.e. the majority believed active). In
contrast, bforced guessesQ made at the end of the study were more consistent with uninformed random
guessing. This indicates that study-related factors may affect participants’ willingness to express their
opinion, and DK does not necessarily represent successful blinding. These observations justify the use
of forced guesses rather than DK responses and suggest that the weighting system underlying James’
blinding index is not ideal.
In view of the preceding discussion, we define a successfully blinded trial as one in which
participants’ or researchers’ beliefs about the nature of the intervention assigned to each participant do

Table 2
Stratified analyses: incidence rates (episodes of highly credible gastrointestinal illness (HCGI) per person year at risk) by
intervention group stratified by participants’ beliefs at weeks 2 and 16 (adapted from Colford et al. [25] and Rees [26])
Intervention group
Belief sequence
Active–active
Placebo–placebo
Active–placebo
Placebo–active
All

Active (95% CI)

Placebo (95% CI)

2.8
0.6
2.3
0
2.2

3.3
0.3
3.6
3.7
2.8

(1.7–4.5)
(0.2–1.9)
(1.0–5.4)
(n=2)
(1.4–3.4)

(n=48)
(n=16)
(n=3)
(n=69)

(1.9–5.7) (n=35)
(0.04–2.2) (n=11)
(1.8–7.0) (n=14)
(0.5–25.2) (n=3)
(1.8–4.5) (n=63)

Rate (95% CI)

Incidence rate
ratio (95% CI)

3.0
0.5
3.3
2.2
2.5

1.2
0.5
1.6
–
1.3

(1.8–5.0) (n=83)
(0.1–2.0) (n=27)
(1.7–6.7) (n=17)
(0.3–15.1) (n=5)
(1.6–3.9) (n=132)

(0.6–2.4)
(0.1–4.7)
(0.5–4.7)
(0.7–2.5)
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not significantly bias the study’s findings. This definition shifts focus away from the correctness of
beliefs; instead, it emphasizes the beliefs themselves and their potential association with health
outcomes. A variety of studies could fulfill our definition of a successfully blinded trial, including (i)
studies in which groups are comparable with respect to beliefs and beliefs do not modify the effect of
the intervention on outcomes; (ii) studies in which beliefs differ by group but are not associated with
the outcome; and (iii) studies in which participants’ beliefs are similar until a specific outcome
assessment takes place that affects these beliefs. For the first two scenarios, successful blinding can be
confirmed by demonstrating that belief patterns do not differ significantly by intervention group, and
do not modify the exposure–outcome relationship. For the third scenario, beliefs must be ascertained
before the outcome assessment to establish whether unblinding occurred at a time when it could have
biased the outcome.
The main limitation of our study was that we did not ascertain baseline beliefs until two weeks’
participation were completed; however, in our study beliefs at week 2 were remarkably similar by
group. For future studies, we recommend ascertainment of beliefs after informed consent but before
randomization to assess the effects of the enrollment and consent processes but not the intervention. In
addition, we focused on participant blinding and did not measure beliefs among the research team. We
acknowledge the importance of measuring blinding effectiveness among investigators, outcome
assessors and analysts and propose that our methods be modified to suit these other important groups.

5. Conclusion
In summary, assessment of blinding effectiveness via changes in beliefs identified group-related
differences in participants’ beliefs that were not identified by cross-sectional analyses of beliefs at
the end of the trial. The longitudinal evidence for unblinding was statistically significant and was
supported by evidence that beliefs were associated with—and hence might bias—the primary
study outcome, suggesting that the intervention effect should be reported within belief strata.
Our investigation raises concern about the sensitivity of the more commonly used crosssectional analyses and the relevance of those based on the correctness of responses. The
approaches we recommend to evaluate blinding effectiveness are (1) measurement of beliefs
rather than correctness of beliefs, (2) a two-point sequential measure of belief patterns, (3) forced
guesses for DK responders, (4) analysis of the main measure of effect and/or other reasons for
participants’ beliefs, stratified by belief patterns, and (5) a description of the reasons for
participants’ beliefs, to elucidate the possible role of beliefs in the causal pathway. Future studies
should compare cross-sectional and longitudinal approaches in alternate settings, and attempt to
measure the likely impact on trial results of the bias caused by beliefs about the intervention.
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Appendix A
A.1. Howard’s index [14]
The proportion of all N participants who breally knewQ their group assignment is the difference between
the proportions guessing their treatment correctly (n 1/N) and incorrectly (n 2/N) after bdon’t knowQ
responses have been redistributed to the forced responses, bguess correctlyQ and bguess incorrectlyQ:
H ¼ ðn1 ÿ n2 Þ=N:
A.2. James’ blinding index [19]
BI ¼ 1=2½ð1 þ n3 =N Þ þ ð1 ÿ n3 =N Þ4K ;
where n 3/N is the proportion of all N participants who don’t guess (i.e., bdon’t knowQ) and K is a
measure of agreement between beliefs about assignments and actual assignments. One can see that
participants who do guess are weighted by K, whereas participants who don’t know are weighted by
1. It is not obvious that, within K, participants who guess correctly are weighted by 0 and those who
guess incorrectly are weighted by 0.75.
Blinding is said to be adequate if BI and its confidence limits exceed 0.5.
Appendix B. Hypothetical data to show potential bias in relative risk caused by participants’
beliefs
Exposure
Truth
Placebo group
Active group

Outcome
Disease

No disease

40
20

20
40
RR = 0.50 (95% CI 0.34 – 0.75)

a. All participants believe bactiveQ; under-reporting of the outcome
Placebo group
32
Active group
16

b. All participants believe bplaceboQ; over-reporting of the outcome
Placebo group
44
Active group
28

28
44
RR = 0.50 (95% CI 0.31 – 0.81)

16
32
RR = 0.64 (95% CI 0.47 – 0.87)
(continued on next page)
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Appendix B (continued)
Exposure

Outcome
Disease

c. All participants respond incorrectly; differential reporting of the outcome
Placebo group
32
Active group
28

d. All participants respond correctly; differential reporting of the outcome
Placebo group
44
Active group
16

No disease
28
32
RR = 0.88 (95% CI 0.61 – 1.25)

16
44
RR = 0.36 (95% CI 0.23 – 0.57)

In a hypothetical study, 120 subjects were randomized to two groups of 60. We assume that, among participants who believe
that they are receiving the placebo device, 20% of those without disease are misclassified as having disease. Among participants
who believe they are receiving the active device, 20% of those with disease are misclassified as not having disease.
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